

SECRET

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Tuesday - 29 July 1969

Page 2

4. (Secret - JGO) Met with Representative Edward Hebert (D., La.) who advised that he has received some questions from other members of the Louisiana delegation concerning the closeout of the air field at New Iberia, Louisiana. I advised Representative Hebert that it was my understanding that GSA would be turning over the air field to the parish early this fall on schedule but that I would check the details and be back in touch with him.

5. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mrs. Mary McLaughlin, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, who advised the Committee does still need the transcripts of the Director's briefing of 23 June on a daily basis. I also received from her a copy of the Committee's hearing schedule for this week.

6. (Confidential - JGO) Conversations with various Committee personnel after the Director's briefing of the House Armed Services Committee today indicated that the briefing was not only well received but considered by some as one of the most interesting and capable presentations that has been given to the Committee.

25X1A 7. (Secret - JMM) Accompanied the Director and Messrs. Duckett, Bruce Clark, Carver and [] to a briefing of the full House Armed Services Committee on the subject of Soviet and ChiCom military forces. See Memo for the Record and transcript.

8. (Secret - JMM) Briefed Robert Michaels, House Appropriations Committee staff, on the status of a long-standing defector case. Mr. Michaels showed no particular concern or curiosity.

Briefed Mr. Michaels on recent developments regarding Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet naval visit to Cuba.

Mr. Michaels said he had in mind the Director's request for a date with Chairman Mahon but had been unable to confirm a time with the Chairman.

SECRET

SECRET

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Tuesday - 29 July 1969

Page 3

25X1A

25X1A

9. (Secret - JMM) Met with Senator J. W. Fulbright regarding his 17 July query to Secretary Laird concerning [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I reminded the Senator that Carl Duckett had briefed him on this on 7 May. He recalled the briefing and said he understood the sensitivity of the matter and would deal with it accordingly, but he could not remember what had spurred his inquiry or even the fact that he had signed the letter to Secretary Laird in this connection. He suggested I take the matter up with Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I met with Carl Marcy and told him in very general terms of the nature and sensitivity of the project and asked his cooperation in protecting its security. He too was vague on the background of the Senator's query to Laird, but said he recalled that Fulbright had "gotten some inquiries from somebody" [REDACTED] Marcy also recalled "having heard something about this" from Joe Wolf in the State Department. Marcy said he would look into it further and assured me that he would cooperate in maintaining the necessary security.

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]
JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

25X1A

cc:
Ex/Dir-Compt
O/DDCI

[REDACTED]
Mr. Houston
Mr. Goodwin
DD/S
DD/I
DD/S&T
OPPB
EA/DDP

SECRET

25X1A

Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000200010022-1

Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000200010022-1

Senators Gore and Fulbright Play Semantic Games on ABM

By JOHN LOFTON

On a subject as important as whether or not this country should or should not build a missile defense system, it is sad to see opponents of the proposed Safeguard ABM beginning to use obfuscation as a tactic in the debate.

The two chief obfuscators are Senators J. William Fulbright and Albert Gore. Unable to find any significant chinks in the armor of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's arguments for the ABM, the senator from Arkansas and the senator from Tennessee have begun to play words—semantics—pick nits.

The idea, you see, has been twofold: first, to spread the word that there are major differences between Secretary Laird's estimates of a Soviet first-strike capability and that of the top-level, inter-agency body that coordinates intelligence estimates, the United States Intelligence Board; and, secondly, to try and make appear as a major shift Laird's recent statements that in addition to having a first-strike capability, the Soviet SS-9 missile could also have a second-strike capability.

These two things being established, it would then be a short hop, skip and a jump to a total discrediting of everything Laird said in the past and the case for the ABM would have been dealt the *coup de grace*.

Only a funny thing happened to Senators Gore and Fulbright on their way to discredit Secretary Laird: During the five-hour, closed-door grilling of Laird, accompanied by CIA Director Richard Helms, the anti-ABM forces were unable to show any differences at all between the secretary of defense and the U.S. Intelligence Board.

A source inside the Foreign Relations Committee says that despite rigorous cross-examination of both Laird and Helms, neither Fulbright nor Gore were able to establish any discrepancies whatsoever between the two.

(One senator who saw the press stories the next day reporting on such differences, chuckled, and remarked to an assistant, "I wonder where the papers get this kind of stuff. It simply isn't true.")

The fact that there really were no differences between the two was noted in the *New York Times*, but one had to be a pretty persistent reader to find it.

In the 20th paragraph of their front-page story, the *Times* reported: "While the Intelligence Board may have not made any findings supporting the Laird conclusions, committee members, when pressed by reporters, acknowledged that the board had not made any findings contradicting the Laird first-strike assessment."

The Boston *Globe* quoted Sen. Fulbright himself admitting the same thing: "My own feeling is that the conclusions of the secretary are not based on the conclusions of the United States Intelligence Board." Which is exactly the point: The fact that Secretary Laird's evaluations of Soviet first-strike capabilities are not based on the evaluations of the U.S. Intelligence Board is attributable not to a disagreement on intelligence information or interpretation of that information, but rather to the fact that the U.S. Intelligence Board has simply made no such evaluation! And to try and conclude from the board's silence on the subject, as Gore and Fulbright have done, that there is a basic disagreement with Laird's assessment, is a mischievous non sequitur.

On the subject of the second-strike as well as the first-strike capabilities of the Soviet super missile, the SS-9, Senators Gore and Fulbright again muddy the water.

Accusing Secretary Laird of completely changing the meaning of first-strike capability because of his noting the additional capabilities of the SS-9, they seem unable to grasp the fact that one day a person can say a machine gun may be used to initiate a fusillade of bullets, and the next day that same person can say that that same gun may also be used to fire back after being fired on, and that there is no contradiction in the two statements. The SS-9

might also be usable as a door stop, but because it might be doesn't in any way negate its capability as a first-strike weapon.

So, having been shot down on these two points, it's back to the drawing board for Senators Fulbright and Gore. And when they return with new charges, as they most certainly will, it is to be hoped that they will eschew pettifoggery on the ABM issue, because to indulge in such tactics on so crucial a subject is to not only violate the rules of civil debate but to endanger the security of this nation as well.